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12 The institutional framework of the European 
Union
Markus Jachtenfuchs
12.1  WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT GOVERNANCE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION?
Using the concept of ‘governance’ as an analytical category allows for the possibility that 
collectively binding decisions can be taken by institutions other than the state. However, 
this entails a number of problems which the state typically does not have. In the fi rst 
place, the state possesses the monopoly of the legitimate use of force (Weber 1978, pp. 
54–6; Poggi 1990). Collectively binding decisions must not only be adopted but need 
to be implemented, often against the resistance of strong actors. The monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force is potentially a formidable resource for increasing the chances 
of collectively binding decisions to be put into practice. It is an instrument of power 
understood as the ability of ego to enforce his will upon alter against the latter’s resist-
ance. During the development of the modern state, the monopoly of force has diff erenti-
ated into an external branch, institutionalized in the military, and an internal branch, 
 institutionalized in the police.
Usually, the highest level of government in federal states possesses exclusive control 
over the military and at least partial control over the police or an independent police 
force. In the European Union (EU), the highest level of government has neither a 
military force independent of the member states for projecting power to the outside 
world nor an independent police force which could in the strict sense ‘enforce’ decisions 
upon non- complying member states, fi rms, organizations or individuals (Kelemen and 
Nicolaïdis 2007). The impressive build- up of the EU’s military capability is not identical 
with the emergence of a genuine European army as it was envisaged by the European 
Defence Community which failed in 1954. Instead, it consists of the pooling of military 
forces which are in the last resort controlled by the member states coupled with the crea-
tion of a market for defence industries (Jones 2007). EUROPOL is not the equivalent 
of a European FBI (Occhipinti 2003) but an organization primarily for collecting and 
sharing information. Thus, the EU level cannot rely on the legitimate threat of the use of 
physical force for putting its decisions into practice.
The EU level lacks not only the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, it also lacks 
the monopoly of taxation. Fiscal sociology in the tradition of Schumpeter (1991) has 
argued that looking at the fi nancial resources of a state could reveal important insights 
about its structure and power. This is indeed true: while the EU, compared to other 
international organizations, has an impressive budget of more than 120 billion euros, 
this is just about 1 per cent of the EU’s GDP. In comparison, the federal budget in 
Germany alone amounted to about 250 billion euros in 2007, which corresponds roughly 
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to ten percent of the GDP. In summary, the EU budget is too small to have a major 
macroeconomic impact.
Even more important than the size of the budget is the structure of the EU’s revenues. 
Although the EU praises itself of having a system of ‘own resources’ whereas normal 
international organizations like the United Nations (UN) are dependent on member 
state contributions, it does not have anything similar to an independent tax base. Import 
duties and agricultural levies which are structurally close to such a tax make up only 15 
per cent of the EU budget and are collected by the member states who decide upon the 
fee they take as a compensation for resource collection. Despite its name, the so- called 
‘VAT based resource’ is not a tax or even a share of value added tax which ‘belongs’ 
somehow to the EU. Instead, it is a direct transfer from national budgets calculated on 
the basis of a fi ctitious VAT tax base and including all budget rebates several member 
states obtained in intergovernmental negotiations. The gross national income (GNI) 
based resource, introduced in 1988, now constitutes the largest single source of the EU’s 
income. It completely breaks with the fi ction of an own resource and consists of a direct 
transfer from national budgets, calculated with reference to the gross national income. 
The VAT- based and the GNI resource together account for about 85 per cent of the 
EU’s income. Governance in the EU lacks not only the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force, it also lacks a strong and independent fi scal basis (Laff an 1997; Genschel 
2002). This has important consequences for the shape and functioning of the multi- level 
Euro- polity.
12.2  A TERRITORIAL POLITY WITH VARIABLE GEOMETRY
Thus, the European multi- level system diff ers in important aspects from federal states. 
It does, however, also diff er substantially from typical international forms of multi- level 
governance because the latter are usually confi ned to specifi c policy areas. States partici-
pate in a number of functionally specifi c regimes which are only partially overlapping. 
In the terminology of Hooghe and Marks, international multi- level systems are usually 
Type II systems (Hooghe and Marks 2003) whereas the EU is very close to a Type I 
system.
Most importantly, the EU has a clearly defi ned territory in which decisions taken 
by EU bodies are collectively binding. This territory is the sum of the territories of its 
member states. In this territory, nature protection provisions, banking regulations or 
product standards are equally binding. These rules are adopted by a single set of insti-
tutions which covers all policy issues alike. In the standard version of the law–making 
process, the Commission submits a legislative proposal on which the Council and the 
European Parliament jointly decide. Complaints can be addressed to the European 
Court of Justice (Stone Sweet 2004; Hix 2005).
Underneath this uniform structure of territory and institutions, the EU shows a much 
higher degree of internal diff erentiation than most federal states. It has important func-
tional subsystems with a diff erent territorial scope and a diff erent set of institutions and 
decision- making rules (for an early treatment of the EU’s subsystems, see de Schoutheete 
1990). The most well known of these subsystems is the Eurozone. The EU neither has 
a common currency for everyone nor has it maintained the individual currencies of all 
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its member states. Instead, a strong group has adopted a common currency (the euro) 
which is governed by common institutions such as the European Central Bank or the 
Eurogroup in the Council while the other member states maintain their own currencies 
and central banks (Enderlein 2006; Eichengreen 2007; Hallerberg 2007).
The second important subsystem of the EU is the Schengen system of those states 
which have agreed to abolish border controls among themselves (Anderson and Apap 
2002). The Schengen system now covers 13 EU member states. Ten more member states 
are not yet full members. The UK and Ireland have decided not to join, whereas Norway 
and Iceland – non- EU members – are part of it. Switzerland, another non- EU member, 
has become a full member of the Schengen system as well. As a result, some citizens 
from a non- member state of the EU can move freely in large parts of the EU whereas 
the citizens of some EU member states have to go through a border check when entering 
that zone.
Apart from this territorial diff erentiation, there is also a diff erentiation of decision-
 making bodies in the EU according to functional areas. The most explicit acknowledge-
ment of this diff erentiation were the three ‘pillars’ introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1993. While the sharp distinction between the internal market rules (the ‘Community 
pillar’), foreign policy and justice and home aff airs (the second and third pillars) was 
slowly eroded in subsequent Treaty reforms, some important elements of it still survive 
in the Lisbon Treaty. The Commission does not have the monopoly of legislative initia-
tive in all areas, the European Parliament is only consulted or simply informed about 
important issues, and the European Court of Justice cannot adjudicate disputes under 
all provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.
The European system of multi- level governance is thus close to Hooghe and Marks’ 
Type I but with important elements of Type II. Some important policies such as the 
common currency or the free movement of people are not applied to its entire terri-
tory (but in the latter case even extend beyond it), and while there is largely a uniform 
 institutional system, there are important exceptions to this uniformity.
12.3  A PARTICULAR CONFIGURATION OF LEGISLATIVE, 
EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY POWERS
The standard textbook knowledge about the institutional set- up of modern democra-
cies states that there is and should be a separation of legislative, executive and judiciary 
powers. The EU deviates in important ways from this rule (see Hix 2005, chapters 2 and 
3 for a detailed overview; Majone 2005). A few points are particularly relevant in this 
respect.
First, the European Commission has not only the right but the monopoly of legislative 
initiative in many areas of policy making. The guiding idea behind this very peculiar con-
struction at the time of its creation in the 1950s was to strengthen the orientation of legis-
lative proposals towards a common European interest as opposed to particular national 
interests. For this reason, the founders of the then European Communities created an 
institution which was responsible for the European common good and largely independ-
ent from national governments as well as from voters. The European Commission is in 
essence a technocratic institution detached from societal pressures. Although member 
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states can exercise pressure on the Commission, for example, by threatening not to adopt 
a legislative proposal which the Commission deems necessary or by rejecting funding for 
specifi c policies in the budgetary process, its formal monopoly of legislative initiative 
makes it a very powerful institution. Only in new policy fi elds, most notably in justice 
and home aff airs, member states also have the right to make formal decision propos-
als (for example, Article 76 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). 
Unlike governmental ministries which are normally diff erentiated along functional lines, 
the Commission is a single organization responsible for all EU policies. Its internal 
diff erentiation into issue- specifi c ‘directorate generals’ is less pronounced than the dif-
ferentiation among governmental ministries, and the political level of Commissioners 
is still responsible as a collegiate body for all Commission activities alike. There is no 
equivalent to a ministerial responsibility for a single policy issue and ministry (Cini 1996; 
Hooghe 2001; Nugent 2006, chapter 9).
But the Commission is not only a law- maker, it is also responsible for the execution 
of EU policies. It monitors the application of EU laws in the member states and even 
directly administers a substantial share of certain policies such as agriculture, regional 
assistance, research and development funding or competition rules.
Second, the Council is also a hybrid institution mixing the legislative and the executive 
(Hayes- Renshaw and Wallace 2006). It has a multi- tiered hierarchical structure, ranging 
from civil servants, ambassadors and ministers to heads of state and of government. 
All of them are members of their national executives but on the EU level act as law-
 makers debating, modifying and adopting Commission proposals. In the EU’s multi-
 level system, the Council represents the territorial interests of constituent units (Sbragia 
1993). Unlike the US Senate, however, it is not a parliamentary chamber with elected 
representatives for this very purpose. Instead, it is closer to the German Bundesrat which 
consists of appointed representatives of the Länder governments. As a consequence, the 
Council not only represents the substantive interests of the member states but also the 
institutional self- interests of the member state governments (Scharpf 1988). Unlike both 
the US Senate and the German Bundesrat, the EU Council is not a single body but meets 
in diff erent compositions according to functional tasks (for example, the ministers of the 
environment or the ministers of the interior).
Third, the European Parliament (EP) is a directly elected supranational parliamentary 
body (Corbett et al. 2007). Having started as a purely consultative assembly consisting 
of representatives of national parliaments in the 1950s, it is perhaps the institution which 
has gained most in terms of infl uence in the last decades. This has, however, not led to 
the development of a parliamentary system of government. Even in the Lisbon Treaty, 
some particularities still persist. In some policy areas, most notably in the fi eld of police 
cooperation, the EP is still merely consulted during the legislative process but does not 
have the right to veto proposals or make authoritative suggestions for amendments. As 
a general rule, the EP also does not have the right to suggest legislation but remains con-
fi ned to act upon proposals submitted by the Commission or, in some cases, by a group 
of member states. Nevertheless, the EP has started to adopt ‘legislative resolutions’ 
which are meant to be legislative proposals and which Commission or Council cannot 
easily ignore because the EP has the formal right to veto proposals which are important 
for them. But this informal practice is not the same as a formal right of initiating legisla-
tion. It also does not have full budgetary rights (and not power to tax) but its grip on 
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the EU’s budget is limited on certain types of (‘non- compulsory’) expenditures (Laff an 
and Lindner 2005). And most importantly, the EP does not in any way elect or support 
a European government. The composition of the Council as the chamber represent-
ing territorial interests is in any case determined by the outcome of national elections. 
The composition of the Commission is determined by a common agreement among the 
Council members. As an informal practice, the EP has acquired the right to interrogate 
incoming Commissioners before they take up offi  ce. There is a common understanding 
that a person who is rejected in such a hearing will not be appointed by the Council. As in 
the case of the right of legislative initiative, the EP has extended its powers beyond what 
was originally fi xed in the treaties. Although the relationship between EP, Commission 
and Council increasingly resembles a system of checks and balances, the crucial diff er-
ence to, for example, the US system is that there is no executive with a direct popular 
mandate (Hix et al.and 2007).
12.4  A STRONG COURT AND CONTINUOUS 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
In the confi guration of powers outlined in the previous section, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) plays a particularly important role. Like the EP, its importance has grown 
enormously since the founding of the European Economic Community. But while the 
EP has acquired much of its infl uence by explicit decisions of the member states, such 
as the decision to have direct elections to the EP or the extensions of the EP’s role in the 
legislative process, the ECJ has largely empowered itself without explicit consensus of 
the member states and sometimes against their explicit will and resistance (Weiler 1999; 
Alter 2001; Stone Sweet 2004).
The standard theory explaining the EU polity- making process argues that the member 
states control the EU’s institutional development. Steps for further institutionalization 
are agreed upon in major intergovernmental bargains in which the ‘supranational’ actors 
such as the Commission, the EP or the ECJ have at best a minimal infl uence (Moravcsik 
1998). However, this theory is at odds with explaining the growth of ECJ powers. At a 
purely descriptive level, the ECJ has managed to introduce two principles into the EU 
which in the standard interpretation have transformed a set of intergovernmental trea-
ties into a supranational constitution (despite the fact that the term ‘constitution’ is not 
mentioned in the treaties and even the compromise formula ‘Constitutional Treaty’ had 
to be removed after failed referenda in France and in the Netherlands). These princi-
ples are the doctrines of ‘direct eff ect’ and of ‘supremacy’. The fi rst stipulates that EU 
primary law (mainly the treaties) and some types of secondary law (mainly the so- called 
‘directives’ under certain conditions do not need implementing legislation in order to 
grant individual rights. The second stipulates that in case of confl ict, European law is 
superior to national law, and even to national constitutional law. Both doctrines have 
been developed and further refi ned during the years (Weiler 1991, 1999).
There has been massive resistance from elected politicians and from high national 
courts, most notably from the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, against this radical 
reshaping of the EU’s legal order (Rasmussen 1986; MacCormick 1995). After all, 
however, the legal transformation of the EU and the emergence of the ECJ as the EU’s 
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constitutional court has been accepted (Alter 2001). Rather than directly challenging 
the independence of the judiciary, member states have tried to avoid the extension of 
centralist constitutional doctrine in new areas, for example, by explicitly stating that the 
newly introduced ‘framework decisions’ were not directly applicable (Article 34, 2 (b) of 
the Treaty on European Union). But it is clear that the ECJ has had and still has a strong 
role in shaping the structure of the Euro- polity and the relationship between its levels. 
In the case of framework decisions, a recent judgement of the ECJ seems to suggest their 
direct eff ect in specifi c circumstances against the explicit wording of the Treaty (ECJ case 
C- 105/03, ‘Pupino’, 16 June 2005). More generally, a strong role of the judiciary in adju-
dicating confl icts between levels of government seems a characteristic pattern of federal 
or multi- level systems with independent levels of government and no general predefi ned 
priority of one level over the other (Lenaerts 1990).
While controversies over the extent of the powers of diff erent levels of government 
seem typical for multi- level systems, the salience of the constitutional issue seems to be 
particularly high in the EU. Decisions about the architecture of the EU’s multi- level 
system are not only taken on intergovernmental conferences and by the ECJ but also 
during day- to- day politics. The EP’s attempt to propose new legislation, although it 
does not formally have the right to do so or to have an inaugural vote on individual 
Commissioners, are part of this pattern. The same is true for the debates on the correct 
legal base (that is, treaty Article) for a legislative proposal where the Commission tends 
to prefer provisions allowing for a majority decision whereas the member states tend to 
favour provisions with unanimity. This constitutional dimension is also present when 
new regulatory agencies (for example, on telecommunications) are being planned or 
set up. It is also the background of the debate on the so- called ‘comitology’, that is, the 
committees consisting of representatives of both the Commission and the member states 
(but no representatives from the EP) set up to administer and supervise often highly 
specifi c policies. The ongoing constitutional struggle among EU institutions about the 
distribution of power between the European and the national level (represented by the 
Commission and the Council, respectively) emerges in a number of seemingly technical 
issues discussed in these committees. It forms the background of fi ghts about the condi-
tions under which the member states can block a Commission decision, about whether 
they can just postpone or really stop the decision and about whether a simple or a quali-
fi ed majority was necessary for that purpose (see Joerges and Vos 1999 for an overview 
on comitology).
12.5  DIVISION OF TASKS: A STRONG MARKET WITH A 
WEAK STATE
While Euro- federalists had expected the creation of strong political institutions after what 
they perceived as the demise of the nation state in World War II, history took a diff erent 
course. Nation states did not cede their monopoly of force or their monopoly of taxa-
tion and remained the decisive actors in the political reconstruction of Western Europe. 
They began functionally limited attempts of economic cooperation among themselves in 
order to moderate adverse eff ects of economic interdependence and to realize gains from 
cooperation in order to stabilize themselves as political units (Milward 1992; Haas 2004). 
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The creation of a transnational market remained by far the most important goal among 
member states (Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002; Majone 2005). Market- making took 
place in the fi rst pillar of the EU which was characterized by a monopoly of initiative 
of the Commission, increasingly widespread use of majority voting in the Council and a 
strong jurisprudence of the ECJ against anything that could even remotely be perceived 
as a barrier to the four fundamental freedoms of the EU: the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and people.
As a result, market- making and market regulation is now strongly institutionalized in 
the EU. It is indeed so strong that some authors even regard it as an ‘economic consti-
tution’ (Streit and Mussler 1995) or as a ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1996; Lodge 2008). 
After the symbolic completion of the project to create an internal market by 1992, the 
EU member states have jointly agreed on a common currency and on a central bank 
with a very high degree of independence from political infl uence. While the EU has been 
very strong in the fi eld of market- making or ‘negative integration’, that is, in the removal 
of barriers to the four freedoms, it has been notoriously weak in ‘market- breaking’ or 
‘positive integration’, that is, in the adoption of rules which actively shape the European 
market and even change its functioning. The most notable exception here is the absence 
of large- scale distributive policies (Scharpf 1999; Leibfried 2005). Those redistributive 
policies which are strong on the EU level (such as agriculture, regional development aid 
or research funding) are limited to small segments of the population. A redistributive 
welfare state which explicitly aims not only to make citizens less dependent on market 
income but also to create political loyalty in return does not exist at the EU level but is 
limited to the member states. These welfare systems are extremely complex and diff er 
strongly across countries. There is neither a consensus on which type of welfare state 
one should have at the EU level nor the income to fi nance such a European welfare state 
because the EU does not have the power to tax.
Foreign, security and defence policies are notoriously weak on the EU level and 
largely carried out by member states. The emerging division of labour since the end of 
the Cold War leaves territorial defence clearly with the member states, their armies and 
their monopoly of force, coordinated through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the European pillar of NATO. Progress in this fi eld is remarkable but there 
is no sign of a European territorial defence force or a European military service (Smith 
2004; Carlsnaes 2007). The Lisbon Treaty will create the foundations for a European 
diplomatic service under the direction of a European Foreign Minister (which is not 
allowed to bear that name) but existing alongside with the national foreign ministries 
which are usually much better staff ed and funded. Only in the fi eld of humanitarian 
intervention and crisis reaction forces, the EU is slowly developing its own military capa-
bility. But even the latter still consists of soldiers from national armies. The EU is thus 
fundamentally diff erent from federal states where the highest level of government usually 
has exclusive control over the army and over the foreign service.
The fi eld of policing and judicial cooperation was practically non- existent well into 
the 1990s. However, the initiative to create an internal market until 1992 included the 
goal of an area without internal borders – borders between the EU member states were 
supposed to physically disappear. As a consequence, the EU agreed on the creation of 
an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, a companion project to the internal market 
in the fi eld of internal security (Lavenex 2007). For more than a decade now, this has 
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been an area of intensive legislative and institution- building activity. Initially, issues 
of asylum, migration, policing or criminal justice were perceived by the EU member 
states to be vital national concerns. In order to protect their sovereignty, they created an 
institutional set- up diff erent from the market- related Community pillar, with diff erent 
legal instruments (framework decisions, conventions and so on), with a reduced ECJ 
and EP involvement and without the Commission monopoly of legislative initiative. The 
Lisbon Treaty does not completely abolish these diff erences but drastically reduces them 
(Ladenburger 2008). What is emerging in this fi eld, however, is not a European monop-
oly of force or an equivalent to a supranational ‘economic constitution’ but rather a 
new form of embedding the member states’ monopoly of force into a dense institutional 
structure which has policy- making authority in the issues at stake but leaves sovereignty 
to the member states (see Herschinger et al., Chapter 31 in this volume).
12.6  CONCLUSION: UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE EURO-
 POLITY
The EU is a very special multi- level system. On the one hand, it resembles a federal state. 
It has a clearly defi ned territory and population, a set of central institutions including a 
directly elected parliament and a very strong court, an almost comprehensive range of 
competencies, a common currency and a constitution. On the other hand, the EU has no 
army, no police, no taxes and no welfare state but remains restricted to market regulation 
and the coordination of internal security. During the last decades, the original EU of six 
Western European democracies (France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries) has 
experienced a dramatic geographical expansion towards the West (the UK and Ireland), 
the South (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Malta), the North (Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden) and the East (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as well as Austria). Membership of 
some smaller Balkan countries and of some quite large ones (Belarus, Ukraine and most 
notably Turkey) seems realistic within one or two decades.
While it was still impossible to speak all languages of the cosy EU- 6 (Dutch, French, 
German and Italian), the EU- 27 has more than 20 offi  cial languages, three alphabets 
(Latin, Greek, Cyrillic), a huge variety of state traditions including post- communist 
transition countries and highly diff erent levels of economic development. At the same 
time, its central purpose consists in the complete abolition of borders between those dif-
ferent entities. Globalization, understood as the increase of transborder interactions, is 
thus not an external factor which hits the EU but an endogenous political project. The 
European multi- level polity is therefore characterized by very high levels of economic 
and political interdependence coupled with a very high degree of economic and political 
heterogeneity.
Integrating heterogeneous subunits into a larger whole is the essence of federal states. 
The EU is faced with the same task under the conditions of high heterogeneity and 
high interdependence. It does not have a strong centre with enough resources to sub-
sidize the less developed units and with enough power to enforce its decisions against 
dissenting subunits. Instead, its subunits are sovereign states with the authority to use 
force, to tax and with usually high levels of popular legitimacy. Reconciling unity with 
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diversity in the past has almost exclusively meant strengthening unity. The European 
Commission saw the defence of the European common good against particular national 
interests as its main task. The ECJ has based numerous rulings on the declaration in the 
preamble of the founding treaties to create ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’ and with this justifi cation ruled against a huge number of particular national 
regulations or standards. Concerns about an increasing encroachment upon essential 
national prerogatives and the idea that uniform policies might not be optimal for 
heterogeneous states have found their expression in long political debates about ‘sub-
sidiarity’ (Bermann 1994) or in numerous variants of ‘fl exible integration’ (Stubb 1996) 
but without much impact. Respecting national diversity has usually been regarded as a 
threat to a weakly established and constantly threatened unity. Only few authors have 
argued that preserving national autonomy might be as important as creating more unity 
(Scharpf 1994).
But like any multi- level system, the EU has to constantly fi nd and revise a balance 
between unity and diversity. As it has a relatively weak centre, it cannot enforce unity 
upon potentially dissenting subunits in the strict sense. But the increasing use of quali-
fi ed majority voting which is widely perceived to be an essential tool for maintaining 
the decision- making capacity in an ever- enlarging Union will also put more and more 
member states in a minority position. The EU narrows down the political options avail-
able for member states in many areas but does not possess an independent political 
legitimation for doing so. Self- limitation and the accommodation of legitimate national 
diversity in the Union are the great institutional challenges for multi- level governance in 
the EU.
REFERENCES
Alter, Karen (2001), Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law 
in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Anderson, Malcolm and Joanna Apap (eds) (2002), Police and Justice Cooperation and the New European 
Boundaries, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International.
Bermann, George (1994), ‘Taking subsidarity seriously: federalism in the European Community and the 
United States’, Columbia Law Review, 94, 331–456.
Carlsnaes, Walter (2007), ‘European foreign policy’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben 
Rosamond (eds), Handbook of European Union Politics, London: Sage, pp. 545–60.
Cini, Michelle (1996), The European Commission. Leadership, Organisation, and Culture in the EU Administration, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Corbett, Richard, Francis Jacobs and Michael Shackleton (2007), The European Parliament, 7th edn, London: 
Harper.
de Schoutheete, Philippe (1990), ‘The European Community and its sub- systems’, in William Wallace (ed.), 
The Dynamics of European Integration, London: Pinter, pp. 106–24.
Eichengreen, Barry (2007), The European Economy Since 1945. Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond, Princeton, 
NJ and Toronto: Princeton University Press.
Enderlein, Henrik (2006), ‘The euro and political union. Do economic spillovers from monetary integration 
aff ect the legitimacy of EMU?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (7), 1133–46.
Fligstein, Neil and Alec Stone Sweet (2002), ‘Constructing politics and markets. An institutionalist account of 
European integration’, American Journal of Sociology, 107 (5), 1206–43.
Genschel, Philipp (2002), Steuerwettbewerb und Steuerharmonisierung in der Europäischen Union, Frankfurt 
a.M.: Campus.
Haas, Ernst B. (2004), The Uniting of Europe. Political, Economic, and Social Forces 1950–1957, 3rd edn, Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Hallerberg, Mark (2007), ‘Fiscal and monetary policy. Coordination and integration in macro- economic 
M2424 - ENDERLEIN PRINT.indd   211 1/9/10   16:42:21
212  Handbook on multi- level governance
policy’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond (eds), Handbook of European Union 
Politics, London: Sage, pp. 359–71.
Hayes- Renshaw, Fiona and Helen Wallace (2006), The Council of Ministers, 2nd edn, Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Hix, Simon (2005), The Political System of the European Union, 2nd edn, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland (2007), Democratic Politics in the European Parliament, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hooghe, Liesbet (2001), The European Commission and the Integration of Europe. Images of Governance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2003), ‘Unraveling the central state, but how? Types of multi- level govern-
ance’, American Political Science Review, 97 (2), 233–43.
Joerges, Christian and Ellen Vos (eds) (1999), EU Committees. Social Regulation, Law and Politics, Oxford 
and Portland: Hart.
Jones, Seth G. (2007), The Rise of European Security Cooperation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kelemen, R. Daniel and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2007), ‘Bringing federalism back in’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, 
Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond (eds), Handbook of European Union Politics, London: Sage, pp. 
301–16.
Ladenburger, Clemens (2008), ‘Police and criminal law in the Treaty of Lisbon’, European Constitutional Law 
Review, 4, 20–40.
Laff an, Brigid (1997), The Finances of the European Union, London: Macmillan.
Laff an, Brigid and Johannes Lindner (2005), ‘The budget’, in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark 
A. Pollack (eds), Policy- making in the European Union, 5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
191–212.
Lavenex, Sandra (2007), ‘Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force. Limits of the single market analogy’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 14 (5), 762–79.
Leibfried, Stephan (2005), ‘Social policy’, in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack (eds), 
Policy- making in the European Union, 5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243–78.
Lenaerts, Koen (1990), ‘Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism’, American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 38 (2), 205–63.
Lodge, Martin (2008), ‘Regulation, the regulatory state and European politics’, West European Politics, 31 
(1–2), 280–301.
MacCormick, Neil (1995), The Maastricht- Urteil. Sovereignty now’, European Law Journal, 1, 259–66.
Majone, Giandomenico (ed.) (1996), Regulating Europe, London: Routledge.
Majone, Giandomenico (2005), Dilemmas of European Integration. The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration 
by Stealth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Milward, Alan S. (1992), The European Rescue of the Nation- state, Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1998), The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Nugent, Neill (2006), The Government and Politics of the European Union, 6th edn, Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Occhipinti, John D. (2003), The Politics of EU Police Cooperation. Toward a European FBI? Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner.
Poggi, Gianfranco (1990), The State. Its Nature, Development and Prospects, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press.
Rasmussen, Hjalte (1986), On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice, Dodrecht, Boston, MA and 
London: Martinus Nijhoff .
Sbragia, Alberta M. (1993), ‘The European Community. A balancing act’, Publius, 23 (3), 23–38.
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1988), ‘The joint- decision trap. Lessons from German federalism and European integra-
tion’, Public Administration, 66 (3), 239–78.
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1994), ‘Community and autonomy. Multi- level policy- making in the European Union’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2), 219–42.
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1999), Governing in Europe. Eff ective and Democratic?, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1991), ‘The crisis of the tax state’, in Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Economics and 
Sociology of Capitalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 99–140.
Smith, Michael E. (2004), Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy. The Institutionalization of Cooperation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stone Sweet, Alec (2004), The Judicial Construction of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Streit, Manfred E. and Werner Mussler (1995), ‘The economic constitution of the European Community. from 
“Rome” to “Maastricht”’, European Law Journal, 1 (1), 5–30.
M2424 - ENDERLEIN PRINT.indd   212 1/9/10   16:42:21
The institutional framework of the EU   213
Stubb, Alexander C.- G. (1996), ‘A categorization of diff erentiated integration’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 34, 283–95.
Weber, Max (1978), Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Berkeley, CA and London: 
University of California Press.
Weiler, Joseph H.H. (1991), ‘The transformation of Europe’, Yale Law Journal, 100 (8), 2403–83.
Weiler, Joseph H.H. (1999), The Constitution of Europe. ‘Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?’ and Other 
Essays on European Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
M2424 - ENDERLEIN PRINT.indd   213 1/9/10   16:42:21
